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TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM
Robert L. Hubbard*
I am pleased to be here today. The usual caveats apply to my
comments: what I say is my own opinion and does not necessarily
reflect the position of New York Attorney General Dennis C.
Vacco, the New York State Department of Law, or any other At-
torney General.
As an antitrust prosecutor, I was somewhat puzzled by an invita-
tion to speak on a program entitled healthcare, Poverty, and Au-
tonomy. Although I consider what I do as serving the public
interest for all New Yorkers, including poor New Yorkers, I usually
do not speak on or attend programs with poverty or autonomy in
the title. I do not know whether you believe the forces of competi-
tion I espouse represent a breath of fresh air or a destructive hurri-
cane. In any case, I apologize in advance if I speak with a different
vocabulary.
Before I begin, I note that emotions run high in discussions
about healthcare markets. Dramatic changes are underway and
grave uncertainties exist in healthcare markets. The ways in which
people secure and finance healthcare are rapidly changing. Every-
one worries whether affordable quality healthcare services will be
available to them. Many in the industry have suffered through sig-
nificant personal and professional changes. Institutional survival of
hospitals and other healthcare businesses is often at stake. Given
these dynamic forces, asking whether the poor will receive afforda-
ble quality health care or be lost in the turmoil is a fair question.
I believe that fostering competition is the best way to relieve
poverty and enhance individual autonomy, that is patient choice, in
healthcare markets. The antitrust laws constitute the foundation
and fundamental strength of our democratic free enterprise system.
To quote the United States Supreme Court, the antitrust laws rest
"on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material pro-
* Assistant Attorney General, New York State Department of Law; Member,
Health Care Task Force of the New York State Department of Law; Member, Health
Care Working Group, Antitrust Task Force of the National Association of Attorneys
General. Suggestions and comments are welcome at: rlh\bar\ulj-symp.spc.
683
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
gress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institu-
tions."1 Competition enhances both our democratic and economic
strengths and opportunities, and provides the means to continue
and build upon those strengths and opportunities. The Supreme
Court and I both believe these principles apply in all markets, in-
cluding healthcare markets.2
I respect and recognize that a competitive system is not the only
choice that the government can make. I also note that for years,
New York chose to displace the antitrust laws and impose a regula-
tory system in healthcare markets. 3 The economic literature con-
tentiously debates whether competition or regulation better
achieves higher quality and lower costs. 4 Yet, I remain steadfast in
the belief that a competitive system works best. The overall
strength of our economy is testimony to that belief.
1. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The
Court defined the antitrust laws as "a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." Id.; see
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.").
To quote New York's highest court, the antitrust laws promote a public policy "of the
first magnitude." LaRossa v. Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d 583, 589, 468 N.E.2d 19, 22, 479
N.Y.S.2d 181, 184 (1984) (quoting Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products, Inc.,
21 N.Y.2d 621, 625, 237 N.E.2d 223, 224, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1968)).
2. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
3. There are significant limitations on what a state can do to displace competi-
tion, which in antitrust parlance is called the state action doctrine. The state action
doctrine illustrates the tension between the supremacy of federal antitrust laws and
federal deference to states under principles of federalism. A state cannot directly
shield private parties from the reach of the federal antitrust laws because a state lacks
the authority to repeal federal antitrust law. Consistent with notions of federalism,
however, the state action doctrine allows a state to: (1) regulate without fear of fed-
eral antitrust liability; and (2) expect private compliance with that regulation, even if
compliance might otherwise violate the federal antitrust laws. The active state super-
vision prong of the state action doctrine in effect prevents a state from indirectly re-
pealing the federal antitrust laws without replacing them with a fully implemented,
regulatory scheme. In short, a state can indirectly limit the reach of the federal anti-
trust laws only by enacting and actively supervising a regulatory scheme. For a more
traditional description of the state action doctrine, see Sarah Vance, Immunity for
State-Sanctioned Provider Collaboration After Ticor, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 411-20
(1994).
4. Compare, e.g., James Robinson & Harold Luft, Competition and the Cost of
Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982, 23 JAMA 3241 (1987) (arguing that prices are higher for
hospitals in competitive markets) with Glenn Melnick et al., The Effects of Market
Structure and Bargaining Position on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 217 (1992).
(arguing that prices are lower for hospitals in competitive markets).
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Healthcare markets still have regulations that strike me as illogi-
cal and anticompetitive. For example, as an antitrust lawyer, I just
do not accept the reasoning behind Certificate of Need (hereinaf-
ter CON) laws.5 Under CON laws, before you build a big ticket
medical item, like a heart institute, you have to establish for the
state that the community needs a heart institute.6 Antitrust law-
yers try to eliminate, rather than formalize and erect barriers to
new entry into markets. You do not have to convince some gov-
ernmental body of a need before you build a building or start a
business, but you do (under CON laws) before you build a heart
institute. For the life of me, I cannot understand why society ap-
propriately allows many frivolous things while it has a policy, as set
forth in CON laws, against too many useful things like heart
institutes.
Nonetheless, the New York State Legislature generally has de-
cided that competition should be the driving force in healthcare
markets.7 After years of the state setting the reimbursement rates
and other aspects of the revenue of hospitals, those rates are now
set by negotiation between hospitals and purchasers.8 Numerous
benefits are already evident. For example, I am heartened to read
that hospitals and other healthcare providers now compete for pa-
tients, including Medicaid patients.9 Government is not really ca-
pable of imposing anything more than minimum standards.
Applying the antitrust laws aims for higher than minimum stan-
dards. No regulatory system can deliver the quality provided by
the choice among alternatives. Applying the antitrust laws fosters
patient choice, rather than government or doctor control. With
choice, healthcare consumers can choose better (not just minimally
acceptable) healthcare services.
From my perspective, the question to pose is what can be done
to make competition work better. Healthcare markets have signifi-
cant market imperfections. For example, to be effective the anti-
trust laws depend upon the flow of market information. Yet,
because third party payers dominate healthcare markets the usual
flow of information about "value" or "quality" just does not occur.
The economic incentives for health care consumers do not foster
5. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2802 (McKinney 1993).
6. Id. at § 2802(2).
7. 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 639 § 1.
8. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Hospitals Start Open Competition Under a New Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1997, at Al.
9. See id.
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competitive changes as well as when third party payers are in-
volved. Co-payments and deductibles do not foster competition as
directly as direct payment by the purchasers of healthcare would.
Moreover, even the most basic frames of reference are not avail-
able in healthcare markets. Information on the long term effects of
various regimens of treatment are simply not available in a form
that allows a purchaser of medical services to make an informed
decision on which regimen to choose. This selection is a difficult
task primarily because human health is both complicated and influ-
enced by many factors. Take, for example, back pain. Some doc-
tors urge bed rest. Others recommend surgery to relieve the
pressure that vertebrae inflict on the nerves. Chiropractors do
something else entirely different. No cogent analysis demonstrates
or will demonstrate soon which of these regimens work best.
Healthcare markets would benefit from developing procedures of
gathering information to improve the flow of information. I think
we will continue to do better and recognize that more and more
procedures to measure value and quality of healthcare services are
being developed and standardized.
